Eldon P. Rowley v. The Industrial Commission of Utah et al : Brief of Plaintiff by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
Eldon P. Rowley v. The Industrial Commission of
Utah et al : Brief of Plaintiff
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Aldrich, Bullock & Nelson; Attorneys for Plaintiff;
F. A. Trottier; Attorney for Respondents;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Rowley v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 10053 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4479
~ UNNERS\iY OF UTAH 
.IUN 3 0 t964 
L, ....... • 'Y LAW. ILJ•'-f\i>. 
In the Supreme Court of the 
State of bt~ \ \_ ~ .. () 
~~f\R 1 b .,:k-< 
ELDON P. ROWLEY, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE , CASE 
STATE OF UTAH; THE STATE INSUR- I NO. 10053 
ANCE FUND; and EDGEMONT DEVEL- ) 
OPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation. 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
Writ of Certiorari to Review Decision of 
Industrial Commission 
F.A.TRO'ITIER 
1660 Garfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON 
35 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Attorney for Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
NATURE OF CASE............................... 1 
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. . . . . 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS.......................... 2 
STATEl\tiENT OF POINTS......................... 6 
ARGUMENT ..................................... 6 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AROSE OUT OF AND 
IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. . . . . . . . . 6 
CASES 
Conunercial Casualty Insurance Company vs. Strong, 
-l4 s.w. 2d 805. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Fintzel vs. Stoddard Tractor and Equipment Company, 
260 N.W. 725................................. 9 
Morgan vs. Industrial Commission, 66 Pac. 2d 144.... 9 
Stroud vs. Industrial Commission, 272 Pac. 2d 187. . . . 8 
Sullivan vs. Industrial Commission, 79 U. 317, 2 Pac. 
2d 924 ................................. 4 and 8 
1\vin Peaks Canning Company, et al vs. Industrial Com-
mission. 196 Pac. 853.......................... 9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ELDON P. ROWLEY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, ) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE \ CASE 
STATE OF UTAH; THE STATE INSUR-I NO. 10053 
ANCE F1JND; and EDGEMONT DEVEL-
OPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation. 
Defendants. J 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to review the decision of the Indus-
trial Commission made on September 30, 1963. 
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission concluded that plaintiff's 
accident did not arise out of or in the course of his em-
ployment, and denied plaintiff's claim upon that ground. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF 
Upon the Writ heretofore issued by the Supreme 
Court, plaintiff seeks a review of the decision of the In-
dustrial Commission and a reversal of the Commission's 
Order of September 30, 1963, denying plaintiff's claim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 18, 1962, plaintiff filed a claim with the ~ 
dustrial Commission for an injury to his back (R-3). He 
alleged in his application that the injury arose out of or 
in the course of his employement. After denial of the 
claim by the State Insurance Fund on July 30, 1962, the 
lllatter was set for hearing by the Commission. (R-4). On 
November 13, 1962, a hearing was had before Clarence 
J. Frost, Referee. (R-11 to 35). 
Subsequent to the hearing, the Referee made the fol-
lowing recommended findings: 
"Applicant alleges that while checking with a fam-
ily that had just purchased a home from the com-
pany that he owns and operates, that he fell off a 
curbing, injuring his ankle and back. Applicant is 
a principal stockholder and manager of the company. 
In his capacity as manager, he alleges that he does 
nearly all the selling. Although the alleged injury 
occurred on a Sunday afternoon, the Referee believes 
the applicant was in the course of his employment. 
That it was a normal procedure to check with the 
purchaseT of a home especially in light of the fact that 
the applicant's company had been paying a penalty 
for ten days because of delay in construction. At the 
exact time of the fall there is some question as to 
whether the applicant had departed from his employ-
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ment. The Referee contends that there was no de-
parture and if there were, it was of a minor and in-
significant nature. 
"However, in light of the records and testimony 
indicating previous serious difficulty with applicant's 
back, the Referee is not convinced that the alleged 
accident had a significant relation to the overall con-
dition of the applicant's back. 
11The Referee makes the following findings: 
1. The applicant sustained an injury on Decem-
ber 8, 1961. 
2. The injury resulted from an accident arising 
out of or in the course of employment. 
"The Referee further recommends that the medi-
cal aspects of this case be referred to a medical panel." 
(R-38). 
Six days later on January 14, 1963, the Commissioo 
adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of 
the Referee as the Findings and ConclusiOIDS of the In-
dustrial Commission. (R-37). 
Thereupon, The State Insurance Fund made appli-
cation to the Commission for a re-hearing, which was 
granted on February 28, 1963 (R-40). A re-hearing was 
had before Otto A. Wiesley, Referee, on May 20, 1963, and 
on September 30, 1963, the Commission made an order 
denying plaintiff's claim, (R-60), which order reads in part 
as follows: 
"The Conunission does not disagree with the Ref-
eree's finding that an accident occurred as alleged 
nor do we reject the panel findings and conclusion. 
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"The Commission finds and concludes that the ac-
cident did not arise out of or in the course olf appli-
cant's employment. We base our conclusions on the 
Utah Supreme Court decision in Sullivan vs. Indus-
trial Commission, 79 U 317, 2 Pac. 2d 924. The Court 
said: 
'Though an employee is, by terms of his employ-
ment, required to be ready to pe'rform his duties fo[' 
his employer at any hour of the day or night, it does 
not follow that every accident or injury that he may 
receive during the course of the 24 hours arises out 
olf his employment. To be compensable, it must au-
pear that at the time of the injury he was discharg-
ing some of the duties he was employed to rperforn1, 
or that he was doing something in some way connec-
ted with or incidental to, the duty owing to the mas-
ter.'" (Emphasis supplied) 
Complying with the statutes, plaintiff filed a Peti-
tion f.or Re-hearing on October 28, 1963, (R-63), which 
was denied by the Commission on December 9, 1963 (R-
64). Upon application of the plaintiff, an Extraordinary 
Writ in the Nature olf Certiorari was duly issued by this 
Honorable Court and served upon the defendants on Jan-
uary 8, 1964. 
The oruy factual findings bearing upon the question 
as to whether or not plaintiff's injury arose out of or in 
the course of his employment appear in the Recommended 
Findings of Fact of Clarence J. Frost, Referee, dated Jan-
uary 8, 1963, quoted above, which Recommended Find-
ings were adopted by the Commission on January 14, 1963. 
It will be noted that the decision of the Commission dated 
September 30, 1963, denying plaintiff's claim simply re-
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verses its prior conclusion that the injury did not arise out 
of or in the course of plaintiff's employment and recites 
no factual matters beyond the following: 
11The Commission does not disagree with the Ref-
eree's findings that an accident occurred as alleged 
nor do we reject the panel findings and conclusions." 
(R-60). 
The fact that an injury occurred and the manner in 
~vhich it happened are not in dispute. The record is quite 
clear that plaintiff substantially owned and controlled 
Edgemont Development Company, (R-17) and was its 
acting manager (R-20). The Company was in the busi-
ness of building and selling houses and both the building 
and selling were done by plaintiff foc the Corporation. (R-
20). There is no disagreement either, that plaintiff went 
to the home of James A. Jensen who had purchased the 
home from Edgemont Development Company, for the pur-
pose of seeing that all of the utilities, such as the power, 
gas and all of the things within the house were working 
properly so that it would be livable (R-13). This was a 
normal procedure and was especially justified in this case 
because the Company had been paying a penalty for con-
struction delay for about ten days previous (R-26). Like-
wise, there is no dispute that Mr. Jensen's car was stuck 
in the snow and that plaintiff instructed his boy to get a 
tractor which was owned by plaintiff's employer and pull 
Mr. Jensen's car out (R-32). Unfortunately, however, 
the boy couldn't start the tractor so plaintiff started to 
walk in the direction of the tractor to see what the diffi-
culty was and when he reached the cwbing in front of 
the house he slipped and fell, sustaining injury (R-14-15). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AROSE OUT OF AND IN 
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AROSE OUT OF AND IN 
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
Although it is not entirely clear from the orders of 
the Commission above referred to, it seems to be the Com-
mission's position that there was a dearture from his em-
ployment when plaintiff started for the tractor. This 
conclusion of law was apparently reached on the theory 
that the walk to the tractor was for a purpose foreign 
and not incidental to any duty owed to his employer, and 
theretfore, when the firSit step was taken toward the trac-
to[' plaintiff was no longer in the course of his employ-
ment. 
We submit that neither logic, reason, nor the decided 
cases support such a conclusion. 
The plaintiff himself put it very succinctly at the 
hearing when he said: 
"Mr. Frost, the reason that I have belabored the 
point otf what I have done for the people was to es-
tablish the fact that when we were assisting him in 
getting his car out of the stuck position it was neces-
sary to keep and maintain good public relations. How 
would anyone look toward me, as a salesman-or in 
this particular case, Mr. Jensen-if I had said: 'I am 
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sorry I can't help you get your car out of there. You 
are going to have to hire someone to come up from 
town and pull you out of there,' when within sight 
of both of us is the tractor." (R-32). 
On pages 32 and 33 of the record appears the follow-
"THE REFEREE: I don't want to argue with 
you at this point, but I mean we have got a situa-
tion here where, whether you are a friend or whether 
you are a no good, if you volunteer and do somerthing 
for somebody you don't have to do, you're not in the 
course of your employment. Now I'm not saying that 
is what you did, but this is the thing it looks like to 
me that it's got to come down to, to decide that point." 
"MR. ROWLEY: Well, that is the position I 
thought The Insurance Fund was taking, and I'm 
trying to establish the fact that it was necessary for 
me to help him get his car out of the position that it 
was in, in order to maintain good public relations. 
Because all of my homes have been sold, or the bulk 
of my homes have been sold, as a result of the rela-
tionship that existed between me and previous buy-
ers. For instance we have taken people in Mr. Jen-
sen's house, and as a result of that I have sold other 
houses. Because Mr. Jensen was satisfied, and be-
cause of the way I treated him, is the reason he was 
satisfied. And I am sure if I had walked off and left 
hin1 stuck, with it snowing the way it was, he couldn't 
have had a good attitude toward the Edgemont De-
velopment Company and myself. And I don't know 
of anyo:1e that could." 
"THE REFEREE: Well, I think that you have 
got your point over very well. I think that you have 
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made us understand what yow- posjtion is, and I think 
tlrat you have done a good job." 
Among other things, the Commission's conclusion ig-
nores the fact that the tractor was owned by Edgemont 
Development Company and that plaintiff, as its manager, 
salesman, and builder, made the decision that to help Mr. 
Jensen get out of the snow was in furtherance of the Com-
pany's interests. Certainly, if the boy had been an em-
ployee and he had suffered injury, he would have been in 
the course orf his employment. Does it make any legal 
difference that the manager of the company, on the same 
mission, was the person injured? 
In the case of Stroud vs. Industrial Commission, 272 
Pac. 2d 187, this Court held that where a police officer, on 
his day off, arranged with two other officers to check out 
to them, in his capacity as a Sgt., a special police car, and 
while waiting for such officers, accidentally discharged 
his revolver killing himself while assisting another officer 
to transfer cases of beverages to his automobile for trans-
portation to a police benefit party, the accident "arose out 
of" and "in the course of" his employment. 
The case of Sullivan vs. Industrial Commission, Supra, 
relied upon by the Commissioo, is not in point. As this 
Court said about the Sullivan case in the Stroud case: 
"Clearly the case stands for the proposition that 
an emplo~ee on 24 hour call is not covered by Work-
man's Compensation Acts where he deviates from the 
purposes of his employment, but it cannot be author-
ity upon which to determine that Stroud, under dif-
ferent ciDcumstances, had stepped outside his employ-
ment after having entered upon it by undertaking a 
simple task not connected with that employment" 
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We believe plaintiff's case is stronger than the Stroud 
case because the task which the plaintiff undertook was 
actually in the furtherance of his employer's business and 
not outside of it. In any event, if it could possibly be said 
that when plaintiff started for the tractor there was a 
departure from his employment, such departure was in-
significant and immaterial. (See Twin Peaks Canning Com-
pany, et al vs. Industrial Commission, 196 Pac. 853; 
Thompson vs. Industrial Cc·mmission, 27 Pac. 2d 436; Mor-
gan vs. Industrial Commission, 66 Pac. 2d 144; Fintzel vs. 
Stoddard Tractor and Equipment Company, 260 N. W. 725; 
Comm£"rcial Casualty Insurance Company vs. Strong, 44 
s.w. 2d 805). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the Order 
of the Commission dated September 30, 1963, denying 
plaintiff's claim upon the ground that the injury did not 
arise out of or in the course of his employment should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. Robert Bullock for: 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
35 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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